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This paper reviews issues raised by the use of private firms to finance, build, and/or operate 
highways — issues including cost of capital, level and structure of tolls, and adaptability to 
unforeseen changes. The public sector’s apparent advantage in cost of capital is at least partly 
illusory due to differences in tax liability and to constraints on the supply of public capital. The 
evidence for lower costs of construction or operation by private firms is slim. Private firms are 
likely to promote more efficient pricing. Effective private road provision depends on well-
structured franchise agreements that allow pricing flexibility, restrain market power, enforce a 
sound debt structure, promote transparency, and foster other social goals. 
 
1. Introduction 
  Privately owned or operated roads, once common but largely phased out over the 
twentieth century, are making a startling comeback. Spain, Portugal, Italy, and France have 
recently converted their high-speed intercity expressways to mostly private systems. The UK and 
Finland, among other countries, have taken steps in that direction; Australia and Canada have 
important private road projects; even in Latin America, privately built and operated toll roads are 
not unusual.
1  
  In the United States, privatization has moved more slowly, but nonetheless is gathering 
momentum. New roads have been privately financed in California, Virginia, and Texas, while 
existing public toll roads have been privatized in Illinois and Indiana, with other states sharply 
debating whether to follow suit. Much of this activity proceeds opportunistically, but in 2004 
                                          
1See Joint Transport Research Centre (2008), especially sect. 2.5 and Annex. Gómez-Ibáñez and Meyer (1993, ch. 
7-11) describe earlier experience.   2
Texas adopted a plan (subsequently delayed) to systematically integrate private highway builders 
and operators into future highway expansion.
2 
  What accounts for this revival? The most potent factor is public-sector financial 
difficulties and, especially in the US, heavily reliance on the shrinking tax base of fuel purchases. 
A second factor is experience with privatization and deregulation of other types of public 
services such as electricity, water, and mass transit. A third is the desire to lower the cost of 
providing highway infrastructure. A fourth factor is urban congestion, the intractability of which 
leads policymakers to look for alternatives to “business as usual;” those alternatives include 
pricing, which in turn makes private provision more natural.  
  Each step toward private involvement raises public concern about numerous issues such 
as toll rates, market power, risk bearing, cost overruns, bankruptcies, public bond ratings, use of 
revenues, and uneven application of tax provisions. Most of these are economic matters 
amenable to objective analysis, but they are complex and answers are not always definitive. 
  The purpose of this paper is to review the main economic issues involved in private 
provision of roads. It does not seek a “winner” in some overall debate about privatization; rather, 
it is aimed at identifying the factors that determine whether any given private initiative is in the 
public interest. The analysis takes advantage of accumulating experience with private provision 
of highways in order to formulate some general principles. 
  I take private provision of roads to mean the use of private firms for substantial parts of 
decision-making and finance — roughly what is covered by the loose category called “public 
private partnerships” (PPPs).
3 Examples of private decision-making roles within PPPs include 
                                          
2 Forsgren and Macdonald (2005) provide a more detailed recent US history. 
3 Standard & Poor’s defines a PPP as “any medium- to long-term relationship between the public and private 
sectors, involving the sharing of risks and rewards of multi-sector skills, expertise, and finance to deliver desired 
policy outcomes” (Forsgren and Macdonald 2005, p. 46).   3
design, finance, construction timing, setting of price schedules, charging and enforcement, public 
relations, and emergency response services. In order to provide concrete institutional context, I 
focus especially on the United States, where the requirements for maintaining and further 
expanding a network worth perhaps $1.7 trillion are overwhelming the current financing system, 
built primarily around fuel taxes that raised just $72 billion in 2007.
 4 
 
2.  Basic Issues: Capital, Financing, and Incentives 
  The most basic issues that distinguish capitalism as a form of economic activity are those 
governing disposition of capital and the resulting incentives on economic actors. Unsurprisingly, 
these same issues are at the heart of the cases for and against private road provision. They 
include the sources and costs of investment funds and issues of risk bearing, efficiency, and 
innovation. 
 
2.1   Sources of funds  
  As noted, a prime motivator for private road provision is that the public sector is short of 
funds. In several cases, PPPs have dramatically speeded up desired investments. Is this a genuine 
advantage of the private sector, or is it just an accounting anomaly? 
  Ultimately, the availability of investment funds for infrastructure depends on the 
economy’s savings rate and on decisions allocating those savings to specific sectors. One could 
argue that citizens desiring improved infrastructure should be equally willing to tax themselves 
or to encourage private investment funds to flow from other sectors of the economy. 
  However, there are practical constraints on the public sector’s ability to respond to 
                                          
4 Small and Verhoef (2007), p. 112; US FHWA (2008), Tables MF-1, FE-9.   4
citizens’ investment priorities. Restrictions on debt finance may prevent state and local 
governments from borrowing, even to finance projects that would eventually pay for themselves 
through tolls. Instead, investment often depends on current tax proceeds, making it difficult to 
accommodate fluctuating investment needs. To some extent, such debt restrictions can be 
overcome through inter-governmental transfers from a higher level of government; but national 
governments also are politically limited, as illustrated vividly by the excruciating negotiations 
over recent re-authorizations of US federal highway programs. 
  The private sector, meanwhile, has sources of investment funds that are particularly well 
matched to road projects, especially pension funds and holdings of insurance companies. 
Managers of these funds need long-term investments with relatively stable returns, and 
consequently have contributed importantly to the boom in private finance of road investments. 
  Thus, one can reasonably argue that the private sector is a legitimate way to expand the 
public’s ability to finance desired road investments. A proviso is that the public sector could in 
principle provide such financing itself, and perhaps would do so through some political process 
if the private option were unavailable. 
 
2.2  Cost of capital 
  An oft-cited drawback of private finance is that the private sector has to pay more for its 
capital than does the public sector. There are several factors behind this cost differential, 
especially taxes, risk-bearing, and debt structure. In assessing them, it is important to consider all 
the social costs, not just the financial cash flows. 
   5
Taxes on capital 
  From the point of view of a state or local government in the US, the federal tax 
exemption of interest payments on state and local bonds is clearly an important cost saving, often 
highlighted in comparisons of public and private options. In 2005, this exemption was extended 
selectively to certain private road ventures as well, through the mechanism of tax-exempt Private 
Activity Bonds. 
  However, the tax-free status of a bond is not a social saving in comparison to taxable 
forms of finance. Rather, it represents a shift of certain capital costs from the project-specific 
account to a general governmental-revenue account. A social-cost comparison can be 
accomplished by subtracting from the private costs any tax payments included in them, inflated 
to account for the “dead-weight loss” of raising those tax revenues through some other means. 
This dead-weight loss is a measure of how much consumers must ultimately give up, due to 
higher prices and/or less efficient production, in order to finance each dollar of tax revenue at the 
margin. Empirical work suggests it is typically around 15 percent of tax revenue collected in the 
US, and 15 to 190 percent across various European nations with different marginal tax rates.
5 
  Another important tax consideration is generous income-tax deductions for depreciation 
of private capital investments meeting specific criteria. In this case the provisions favor private 
finance, because the deductions are much larger than the economic value of depreciation actually 
experienced on the assets. Indeed, a major motive for the recent private purchases of toll-road 
leases in Chicago and Indiana was the ability of private investors to realize such depreciation 
deductions. In order to make a valid comparison of social cost, these private tax savings (again 
                                          
5 See Parry and Oates (2000) for a more complete discussion of dead-weight loss, and Small and Verhoef (2007, pp. 
147, 177-178) regarding applications to transportation. For Europe, see Klevin and Kreiner (2006), especially Table 
3, columns S5-S8.   6
adjusted for dead-weight loss of raising public revenues) need to be added to the private cost of 
capital, just as tax liabilities need to be subtracted. 
 
Risk-bearing 
  Road investments involve considerable uncertainty regarding construction cost, operating 
costs, traffic levels, future regulations, and other key determinants of economic returns. The 
resulting “risk premium” raises the return needed to attract investors to markets for private 
capital, but usually not to those for public capital except in times of unusual fiscal difficulties. 
  But does this difference mean that the public sector is inherently better at bearing the 
risks posed by these uncertainties? To address this question, it is important to distinguish 
between pure (uncontrollable) risk and “controlled” risk, where the party has some ability to 
influence the uncertain incomes. (The latter is called “moral hazard” in the insurance industry.) 
We consider pure risk here, and controlled risk in Section 2.3.  
  Aversion to pure risk arises from problems created by being unable to predict the 
outcome of one’s affairs. For example, private individuals are risk averse when undertaking large 
investments if an uncertain outcome may greatly affect their standard of living. Similarly, small 
firms are often risk averse because the managers’ or owners’ livelihoods depend heavily on the 
firm’s earnings. These risks are often reduced by pooling diversified projects, as in the case of a 
large firm or a diversified investment pool such as a pension fund. Even a small firm may show 
little risk aversion if its owners can diversify their portfolios elsewhere and its managers are 
rewarded for risk-taking. 
  The public sector can in principle diversify its projects almost infinitely. Thus the 
national governments of most developed nations can issue bonds with virtually no risk premium.   7
(This is not true for many less developed nations, due to financial problems including past 
defaults.) But the same factors that limit direct government investments also limit governments’ 
risk-bearing ability. Citizens are not necessarily prepared to give carte blanche to their elected 
leaders to cover cost over-runs or other adverse outcomes of risky projects, in part because they 
do not trust those leaders to always act in the public interest. Furthermore, in a federal political 
system, state and especially local governments are subject to considerable fluctuations in fiscal 
health due to national and regional economic factors. Even worse, project risks are often 
positively correlated with those same factors, as for example when a recession causes toll 
revenues to dry up just when local tax revenues are running short. 
  The problem of lack of trust in leaders is actually quite general in both public and private 
organizations, although its magnitude may differ between them. Suppose taxpayers or 
shareholders are well diversified in their overall investments, and thus not really concerned with 
the uncertainty over one particular project. They would then like their managers to invest if a 
project’s expected rate of return is greater than the applicable cost of capital. However, a typical 
project manager is much less diversified in terms of the portfolio of professional projects with 
which he or she is associated. If the project turns out to be a bad one, that manager’s  reputation 
may be damaged regardless of fault. Thus this individual manager may exhibit greater risk 
aversion than the stakeholders. Well-run organizations attempt to compensate for this effect 
through incentives to encourage appropriate risk-taking, but they are difficult to implement in 
such a way as to have just the right effect. 
  For all these reasons, there are genuine barriers to full diversification even by large 
government bodies, potentially causing citizens and/or officials to shun risks. The aversion to 
these risks is a social cost, just like the risk premium in private capital markets. However, this   8
social cost is not reflected in the market interest rate on government debt because the 
government can compel taxpayers to cover defaults. Instead, the social cost is reflected in a 
shortage of public funds for projects that would be warranted under the observed market rates — 
precisely as argued in Section 2.1. A calculation of the social cost of capital, for purposes of 
comparing public and private provision, should then include a “shadow value” reflecting this 
scarcity of funds. Another way to view the same point is that the projects for which a given 
proposal competes for scarce public funds will tend to have rates of return that are  higher than 
interest rates on government debt, and it is these higher rates that constitute the social cost of 
capital for the project under consideration.
6 
  The current state of knowledge does not enable us to say whether this extra shadow value 
of publicly raised capital is as great as the risk premium required by the private sector. In 
practice, the tax-adjusted difference in observed interest rates provides an upper limit to the 




  A private firm’s mix of debt and equity, and the term structure of its debt, have important 
influences on the firm’s cost of raising capital. A highly leveraged structure, i.e. one with a high 
rate of debt to equity, is cheaper for the firm but creates a greater chance of bankruptcy. This is 
                                          
6 This view is similar but not identical to that expressed by Klein (1997) and Irwin (2007, pp. 65-66). They argue 
that the true cost of capital is the risk-free rate of interest plus a risk premium that depends only on the project-
specific risk, not on who bears it. Their rationale is that governments achieve low risk premiums by forcing 
taxpayers to guarantee payment for the project under consideration, and that these taxpayers therefore bear project 
risks for which they are not compensated. But this argument need not apply to the entire project-specific risk; some 
portion of it is in fact diversified through the tax system. Thus there is no reason to assume exact equivalence 
between social and private costs of capital.   9
relevant to the public interest because the public may be severely disadvantaged if a private 
operator goes bankrupt.
7  
  Public entities also need to pay attention to their amount of debt, because it affects their 
credit rating and creates obligations for future taxpayers. This raises a question concerning the 
sale of a long-term lease on an existing revenue-producing road, as illustrated by the Chicago 
Skyway and the Indiana Toll Road. Such a sale converts future revenues, occurring over an 
extended period, into an up-front single cash payment. One consequence is that some of the 
uncertainty over revenues is shifted to the private franchisee, an issue discussed in Section 2.3. 
Another is that the government receives a big block of capital funds in return for giving up future 
revenues — which is very similar to issuing debt, and indeed may be seen as a loophole in 
regulations restricting debt finance. 
 
2.3 Controlled  risk  factors 
  When the outcome of a risk can be influenced by one of the parties involved with an 
infrastructure project, there is a considerable advantage in having that party bear the risk because 
it will then have an incentive to make efficient tradeoffs between adverse outcomes and the costs 
of avoiding them. For example, if a private firm bears the risk of cost over-runs, then it will work 
to assure that its design and construction strategies account for the effects of unexpected events 
on costs. 
  The same example, however, illustrates the complexity of incentives. Some cost-cutting 
measures available to a private firm might reduce the quality of its product in ways that cannot 
easily be detected until later. Examples are legion in the construction industry: poorly mixed 
                                          
7 Furthermore, debt structure often is changed following the conclusion of a franchise, as the franchisee seeks to 
restructure its finances — usually in the form of more leverage in order to reduce its cost of capital.   10
cement, inadequate steel reinforcing bars, substandard electrical wire or plumbing. A good 
franchising process will attempt to control this kind of undesired cost-cutting, perhaps through 
quality specifications, inspections, and the use of reputation as a selection criterion. Another way 
to control it is to combine construction and operation into a single long-term franchise so that the 
firm itself would suffer the consequences of poor-quality construction — thereby perhaps 
expanding the scope of privatization. If none of these control strategies are feasible, a cost-plus 
contract, rather than a PPP, may be the best available option even if it entails some inefficiency. 
  Irwin (2007) points out two important additions to the principle of assigning risk to the 
party best able to control it. First, even events outside anyone’s control can be handled in ways 
that make them more or less costly; a good franchise agreement will assign the risk accordingly. 
For example, a project designer may be able to minimize damage due to the risk of an 
earthquake, whereas the government may better be able to minimize the damage from economic 
fluctuations. Second, it is unhelpful for a private franchisee to bear a controlled risk if it lacks 
authority to implement efficient responses to that risk. Nash (2005) provides an example from 
UK road franchises, in which the franchisee was paid on the basis of the amount of traffic 
generated, thereby shifting the traffic risk to the private sector. But the government retained the 
power to build competing roads and restricted the franchisees’ ability to build interchanges that 
might generate traffic, thereby nullifying most of the potential incentive effects from shifting the 
traffic risk. As another example, some traffic risk may be effectively absorbed by a franchisee 
with authority to build a road in increments rather than all at once (Irwin 2007, p. 59). 
  This brings us to the question of who can best bear the risk posed by uncertain future 
traffic projections. Such uncertainty arises from several sources. One is unknown competing 
services, which are most often under control of a highway authority. Another is land-use and tax   11
policies, which are under control of local or higher-level governments. A third is the health of the 
local economy, which is under some limited control by both local and national governments 
through economic policies. A fourth is the fact that demand depends also on factors controlled by 
the operator, such as ride quality, ease of toll collection, and marketing policies. To complicate 
matters further, some such factors might be privately profitable but socially counterproductive: 
for example, political maneuvering to prevent competing investments. This brief review suggests 
that an ideal arrangement will allocate traffic risks in rather complex ways. 
  Finally, there is the risk of political manipulation or changes in contractual terms, which 
are real possibilities unless contracts carefully specify the franchisee’s rights. Spiller (2008) 
argues that politically motivated opportunism, especially as may be instigated by outside parties 
with their own interests at stake (e.g. competitors for the contract), require that public-private 
contracts be more complete and rigid than contracts between two private parties.  
  One advantage of the franchise process is that it creates the possibility for sophisticated 
allocation of risk through formulas or other provisions. For example, most franchise agreements 
limit future toll rates using a formula involving inflation and/or some measure of economic 
activity. Some specify sharing of revenue surpluses or shortfalls compared to projections. Others, 
especially in the UK, do not even use real tolls but compensate the franchisee using public 
payment of “shadow tolls,” i.e., payments proportional to the amount of traffic. These schemes 
enable the public entity designing the franchise to allocate traffic risk in a rather flexible manner. 
By contrast, public operation places most traffic risk on future taxpayers and/or future users, with 
the mix depending on how toll rates will be adjusted; whereas complete privatization places 
traffic risk fully on the private firm and on any creditors or citizens who would suffer from a 
private firm’s bankruptcy.   12
 
2.4 Cost  efficiency 
  One of the hoped-for advantages of private involvement is that private firms will be more 
efficient, thereby lowering the cost of constructing and operating roads. There are several 
possible reasons. Private firms have stronger financial incentives because costs come out of their 
own profits. They are less prone to political interference in economic decisions, and they operate 
under fewer rules regarding procurement, civil service, union bargaining, affirmative action, and 
so forth — which may serve valid social purposes but also impose some cost. 
  In the case of private highways, does the evidence support this expectation of lower 
costs? There are some anecdotal examples — for example, in France in the 1980s, the private 
firm Cofiroute exhibited lower unit construction costs than its publicly owned counterparts 
(Gómez-Ibáñez and Meyer 1993, p. 201). However, there is little confirmation of such 
differences from systematic evidence. 
  Rather, there is some evidence about a related quantity, cost and time overruns. Allen 
Consulting Group (2007, Table 4.1) examines 54 Australian projects (25 of them in 
transportation) and finds that PPPs had smaller discrepancies between actual costs and those 
specified in the initial contract. There was also a small reduction in time over-runs (Allen 
Consulting Group 2007, Table 4.3). The problem with such comparisons is that the costs and 
times specified in the contracts were themselves probably affected by whether or not a PPP was 
involved. For example, public authorities may have been forced by privatization to more 
carefully specify the nature of a project, in which case smaller overruns reflect better estimates 
rather than cost savings. Furthermore, the possibility of overruns in traditional cost-plus contracts 
provides some flexibility to the public sector, allowing it to expedite contracting while design   13
details are being worked out and to respond to unexpected changes in conditions during 
construction. As noted by Dewatripont and Legros (2005), some cost overruns can be expected 
as an equilibrium phenomenon even in an efficient contracting system. 
  Thus it appears that the conclusion of Gómez-Ibáñez and Meyer (1993) still holds: 
“experience provides only limited support for the enhanced [cost] efficiency of [road] 
privatization” (p. 201). They suggest that private roads might not achieve the kinds of efficiency 
gains seen in other sectors because the bidders are already strongly involved in public 
procurement, and therefore do not realize any additional gains from experience or scale. Still, 
Gómez-Ibáñez and Meyer think that some modest efficiency gains are likely, due to greater 
flexibility and innovation in design, even though this remains unproven. 
  Elsewhere in the transportation sector, there is evidence of somewhat greater efficiency 
advantages of private operators. Bus transit is a case in point.
8 A typical finding is that private 
bus firms operate with 20 percent lower costs, although some of this is through lower wages 
rather than increased efficiency. (Lower wages represent efficiency gains only if they reflect use 
of more appropriately-skilled labor.) But there is also wide variation within each sector. The 
primary factor affecting costs in bus transit appears to be less the form of ownership than the 
types of management incentives used (Perry, Babitsky, and Gregersen 1988). Thus to achieve 
cost efficiency, it may be more important to design good management incentives than to rely on 
privatization. 
 
                                          
8 For reviews see Gómez-Ibáñez and Meyer (1993), especially ch. 2-6, 13; Preston (2005); Karlaftis (2008); and 
Small and Verhoef (2007, sect. 6.3).   14
2.5 Innovation 
  Private operators sometimes propose innovative solutions for difficult social problems 
that can also be viewed as business opportunities. For example, deregulated railroads negotiated 
long-term contracts that greatly expanded the types of service provided to shippers. Deregulated 
telecommunications firms accelerated the use of microwave relay stations for long-distance 
telephone communications, as well as building cellular networks and offering numerous data-
transmission services.  
  Is there scope for similar advances in highway networks? On the face of it, highways may 
seem less ripe for innovation. Yet there are surprising examples of creativity. Cofiroute, a private 
French company with worldwide toll road experience, is completing the A86 outer ring road 
around Paris using a tunnel under the Versailles palace. In order to provide the most congestion 
relief possible at reasonable cost, the tunnel will be restricted to autos and will use narrow lanes 
and short overhead clearances, with a consequently low speed limit of 42 miles per hour.
9 This 
kind of breakthrough could be difficult for a public agency, bound by standards and protocols, to 
achieve. 
  The greatest innovations may come in the form of pricing. It was a private consortium 
that proposed and implemented the toll schedule for California’s State Route 91 express lanes, 
the first US example of time-varying tolls for congestion management. Private firms have also 
promoted innovations in toll collection technology. As discussed later, pricing innovations could 
be an important contribution to efficiency in urban highway operations. 
 
                                          
9 See Poole (2006, pp. 28-31) for discussion of this and other urban congestion-relief tunnels.   15
2.6 Other  issues 
  One concern sometimes raised about private toll roads is that users are already paying for 
roads through fuel and other taxes, and now are asked to pay again through tolls. This critique, 
which applies equally to publicly operated toll roads, is most applicable if the arrangement is 
structured so that tolls cover the cost of the road. In that case, any fuel tax meant also to cover 
road costs should ideally be refunded so as to create a more “level playing field” between the 
private and public sectors. However, the practical significance of the problem is small. User 
charges, including fuel and vehicle taxes, do not fully cover the cost of roads in the US, and 
certainly peak-period user charges don’t come close to covering the capacity cost of major urban 
roads. Furthermore, user charges (such as the fuel tax) can also be considered to be externality 
charges to compensate for the fact that drivers do not fully bear the costs of congestion, 
pollution, and motor vehicle accidents resulting from their individual decisions (Parry and Small 
2005). Thus, it is somewhat subjective to argue that a given tax payment helps “pay for” the road 
on which it is generated. 
  Another issue is how the public sector will use the revenues. As already noted, the sale of 
a long-term lease is similar to issuing public debt; therefore it is legitimate to insist that some 
political mechanism be in place, as in common when issuing debt, to direct the revenues to 
appropriate uses over a time period comparable to the duration of the lease. The lease of the 
Indiana Toll Road and the proposed lease of the Pennsylvania Turnpike appear to meet this 
criterion by putting funds into infrastructure accounts; the lease of the Chicago Skyway did not 
have comparable provisions. An even tighter restriction, namely that toll revenue be used only 
for investments in that same highway corridor, is sometimes suggested but would be inefficiently   16




  One of the most widely held views of professional economists about transportation is that 
the way users typically pay for public roads serves the public interest very poorly. Prices are 
much too low for highly congested roads and do not vary in a helpful way with time of day. One 
of the innovations accompanying private road provision has been some move toward pricing that 
takes congestion into account.
10 This raises the question: can the private sector do a better job of 
designing and implementing efficient pricing structures? To investigate this question, we need to 
consider market structure and regulation, with special attention to priced express lanes. 
 
3.1  Market structure and pricing 
  Some theoretical results are helpful as starting points. First, it is clear that a profit-
maximizing road owner would use congestion pricing if possible. To be more precise, such an 
operator would vary prices by time of day according to changes in the marginal social cost due to 
congestion — that is, in a manner similar to the time-varying pricing that would maximize 
economic efficiency. The reason is that the owner has an incentive to make the road as valuable 
as possible to its users, as they are then willing to pay higher tolls; it can do this by offering good 
service quality, including low congestion. However, the profit-maximizing operator would add a 
markup to marginal social cost reflecting the same consideration as a monopolist in any other 
                                          
10 The US Department of Transportation has given such pricing schemes high priority in its use of various 
demonstration programs authorized by Congress since 1990, the latest of which — the Urban Partnerships Program 
— offers large grants to local regions willing to try out some form of congestion pricing. See US DOT (2008a). For   17
market: namely, the less users are willing or able to switch to other options, the greater the 
markup.
11  
  These observations lead directly to two policy conclusions. First, private operators are 
indeed likely to seek to implement innovative and beneficial pricing structures, as noted also by 
US GAO (2008, pp. 24-25). But second, private operation will often need to be accompanied by 
regulation to keep overall price levels from becoming excessive. An example is provided by the 
privately built and operated M6 Toll Road in the UK, which enables vehicles to bypass 
Birmingham while traveling between London and Liverpool or Manchester. The toll is 
unregulated, and the resulting high toll has been criticized for undermining the road’s 
congestion-relief goals. Price regulation is discussed in Section 4.1. 
  Thus, it seems likely that in realistic situations, the private sector would often adopt 
congestion pricing in some form. In some situations, especially where a new road is being 
financed privately, the public may accept novel pricing arrangements more readily from a private 
than from a public operator. These conclusions are nicely illustrated by the experience with 
several private toll-road franchises in Santiago, Chile, all of which operate with time-varying 
prices and appear to be relatively well accepted. 
 
3.2  Priced express lanes 
  One innovative pricing opportunity is the private finance, construction, and operation of 
special express lanes that parallel a congested road and operate at higher speeds, available for a 
                                                                                                                                       
reviews of congestion pricing, including the rationale, see Small and Verhoef (2007, ch. 4) and papers in Santos 
(2004). 
11 See Small and Verhoef (2007, sect. 6.1.1) for a precise statement and demonstration. The markup is inversely 
proportional to the absolute value of the demand elasticity. The situation is more complex when two or more private 
road owners compete; de Palma and Lindsey (2002) confirm that private operators have some incentives to   18
price which varies by time of day. In most cases these express lanes operate as “High Occupancy 
Toll” (HOT) lanes, in which carpools go for free (or sometimes at a reduced price) and other 
vehicles pay the toll. An example is the “91 Express Lanes” in Orange County, California, part 
of State Route 91; these express lanes were proposed, built, and initially operated by a private 
consortium under the first modern US legislation fostering private road projects.
12 Other 
examples include recently opened HOT lanes in Colorado, planned HOT lanes on the 
Washington Beltway in northern Virginia, and several projects in the Trans-Texas Toll Corridor 
for which proposals were solicited beginning in 2004. In addition, public agencies have opened 
HOT lanes in the San Diego, Minneapolis, and Seattle areas. The US Department of 
Transportation actively encourages such projects through its Express Lanes Demonstration 
Program (US DOT 2008b). 
  These examples raise two questions. Are such express lanes an efficient policy by 
themselves? And might they lead toward a fuller application of economically-based pricing 
tools? 
  The answer to the first question depends on how diverse people are. If people vary widely 
in the values they assign to time savings, then they may sort themselves into two groups, both of 
which benefit from the express-lane scheme: one group with high time values using the toll 
lanes, and one with lower values using the free lanes. This is an example of offering 
differentiated products, similar to what happens in many consumer-oriented industries. If, by 
contrast, most people have similar time values, then the small gains from offering differentiated 
products may be overcome by the efficiency loss of inherent in two roadways failing to 
                                                                                                                                       
introduce time-varying prices, but find that these incentives may be thwarted by fear of provoking a price cut by a 
rival. 
12 The legislation was California Assembly Bill 680 (AB680), in effect from 1989 through 2002. See Sullivan 
(2006) for a detailed account of the 91 Express Lanes.   19
equilibrate. Simulations show that if users are homogenous and the express price is set at a 
profit-maximizing level or at a level designed to make the express lanes congestion-free, too 
many will use the regular lanes, making them more congested than necessary and causing overall 
welfare losses compared to no pricing.
13 However, preliminary evidence from State Route 91 
suggests that value of time does in fact vary greatly across users, and even across trips taken by a 
given user.
14 
  The second question is one of political economy. If private initiatives accustom motorists 
to the idea of paying extra for faster travel, and people see the implementation and charging 
technology working in practice, will they be amenable to more far-reaching pricing schemes? 
The evidence is far from clear, but it seems possible. Public acceptance of nearly all pricing 
schemes has increased as people get used to them and see their effects (Zmud and Arce 2008). 
Following California’s privatization initiative in 1989, the state of Washington passed similar 
legislation and the state’s transportation commission approved several proposals for 
implementation, including one that would gradually turn lanes on Interstate 5 into express lanes, 
one by one, until the entire freeway was priced. Although that proposal did not survive public 
scrutiny, it shows how far some political leaders were willing to go. Today, officials are going 
much further, exemplified by the mayor of New York City proposing a toll ring around all of 
southern Manhattan — clearly inspired by the success of toll rings in London and Stockholm. 
That proposal ultimately was approved by all but one of the necessary parties for 
implementation, the holdout being the New York State Legislature. 
 
                                          
13 Small and Yan (2001), Verhoef and Small (2004). Another factor is that some capacity is lost by dividing a road 
into two parts; see Lee (2008) for a quantification. 
14 Small, Winston, and Yan (2005); Sullivan (2000).   20
4. Franchising  Arrangements 
  One of the main arguments for private sector involvement in road provision is that 
effective competition “for the market” can be fostered at the time a franchise is awarded. 
Furthermore, the terms of the franchise can be structured to fine-tune the incentives, the degree 
of risk-sharing, and the division of economic returns between public and private sectors. Thus, 
the nature of franchise agreements and the procedures for awarding them are critical to obtaining 
public benefit from private participation. Such agreements involve technical matters of finance, 
and so require market sophistication within the public sector — something that is fostered by 
experience, creating one of the arguments for demonstrations and experiments. 
  Market power in private toll roads involves the same public policy issues as in any other 
industry, where such power is typically curtailed by anti-trust laws or regulated as in the case of 
electric utilities. Regulating a toll road is less complicated than an electric utility, but it still 
raises similar basic questions: should regulation specify prices, rates of return, performance 
standards, and/or required investments? To review the many issues surrounding these questions 
here would be prohibitive, but we can consider several that are most relevant for our topic.
15 
 
4.1  Toll rates 
  Most road franchises specify maximum tolls, usually in terms of a starting value and a 
formula for growth. This practice has the advantage of removing future toll changes from the 
political process — at least, that is the hope — but it also has problems. First, it removes pricing 
                                          
15 Gómez-Ibáñez (2003) and Guthrie (2006) provide excellent reviews of these issues as they pertain to 
infrastructure. A central theme is that regulating a monopoly is a variant of the more general problem of designing 
procedures to protect parties who are vulnerable to exploitation following irreversible investments in long-term 
assets whose value is specific to a particular relationship. Similarly, Laffont and Tirole (1993) consider the problem 
of relationship-specific assets to be central in analyzing optimal procedures for public procurement.   21
flexibility and so may prevent an innovative pricing structure. Second, it requires projections of a 
desirable toll rate, possibly far into the future. 
  Theoretical and simulation studies have found that the public benefits from toll roads are 
quite sensitive to the toll rate, especially for long-term contracts. This is especially true when 
there are unpriced close substitutes, which is common and is sometimes even required as a 
condition for allowing a road to be tolled. When there are unpriced close substitutes, setting the 
toll too low will encourage excessive overall corridor traffic, while setting it too high will 
encourage an excessive fraction of that traffic to remain on the already congested free roads. The 
desire to attract traffic away from these free roads is often a special concern, because they are 
likely to be highly congested arterials serving local traffic, affecting noise and pollution levels in 
densely populated areas, and having a worse safety record than expressways. 
  An alternative to specifying the toll is to specify a maximum rate of return, as was the 
case with California’s “91 Express Lanes,” thereby giving the franchisee substantial pricing 
flexibility.
16 The history of rate-of-return regulation of public utilities is not entirely encouraging. 
But one of its main problems —a tendency to encourage padding the capital base in order to 
increase allowed earnings (Averch and Johnson 1962) — is more easily controlled with roads 
than other types of utilities. This is because the capital stock of a road project is mostly in the 
road itself, whose characteristics can be specified readily. Thus, flexible pricing with an earnings 
cap remains a promising way to limit tolls within a private road franchise. 
 
                                          
16 The regulation for the 91 Express Lanes required that any profits exceeding those allowed be shared with the State 
of California. This is different from typical rate-of-return regulation of public utilities, which uses the allowed rate 
of return just as an intermediate step in calculating specific maximum prices (Guthrie 2006, sec. 2.1).   22
4.2  Profitability and subsidies 
  A critical question for private highway finance is the financial feasibility of the initial 
investment. Under what conditions will building, operating, and pricing a highway be profitable? 
  One result is well known in the economics literature. If capacity is added and priced 
according to the theoretically ideal prescriptions of investment analysis and congestion pricing, 
then it will just pay for itself provided there are no scale economies or diseconomies in its 
construction.
17 If road construction instead involves diseconomies of scale, as may happen in 
urban settings because of intersections and rising land costs (Small 1999), then the road would 
even more than pay for itself. However, in the common case where there are scale economies in 
construction, for example due to fixed costs resulting in more capacity than is strictly needed to 
handle the traffic, optimal congestion pricing will not cover the investment cost. Thus subsidies 
are needed, especially for the lower-volume, less financially attractive roads that may be desired 
to encourage regional integration and economic development. 
  The postwar experiences of France and Spain illustrate well these theoretical findings.
18 
Both began building their motorway networks using franchises to private firms, with no public 
funds. This worked well for the most heavily traveled routes, but proved an inadequate financial 
base for continued development of the networks. Due to this and other factors, both nations 
partially socialized the networks during the 1970s, a process only recently  reversed through new 
privatizations. The net result is that most of the motorway networks in France and Spain today 
are in private hands, but were built with substantial portions of public funds. These experiences 
are consistent with a conclusion of Forsgren and Macdonald (2005): 
                                          
17 Small and Verhoef 2007, sec. 5.1.1. There is another technical condition, which is that congestion formation also 
shows no scale economies or diseconomies, that is, congestion is a function only of the ratio of traffic volume to 
capacity. 
18 Gómez-Ibáñez and Meyer 1993, ch. 8, 11.   23
“new and heavily debt-financed toll projects — absent an overwhelming demand profile 
… — will require a significant level of public involvement and, perhaps, public 
investment, to reach investment-grade levels.” (p. 44) 
 
4.3  Transparency 
  Most people believe that transparency is inherently valuable in public affairs. It also is 
needed to facilitate public acceptance of new arrangements. How do public private partnerships 
rate on transparency, in comparison with traditional public procurement? 
  On the positive side, the franchising process makes certain planning assumptions explicit. 
Expectations, commitments, and financial projections must be specified both to define bidding 
terms and to enable bidders to obtain third-party financing. An example is provided by the 2004 
bidding process for a 99-year lease of the Chicago Skyway, which was preceded by the City of 
Chicago commissioning a first-ever detailed financial projection of the Skyway.
19 
  On the negative side, the agreements themselves are highly technical and their provisions 
difficult to explain to the public. Some details may be proprietary and thus not made public at all. 
Private firms can bypass rules that would require a public agency to fully expose its decision-
making. Even when the initial investment is publicly visible, subsequent private transactions, 
such as refinancing of debt or corporate buyouts of participating firms, may obscure 
accountability for specific decisions. 
  Thus transparency is not automatically promoted by private franchising, but it can be if it 
is an explicit goal. For example, the franchise can specify public availability of certain 
information; it can also specify conditions under which the sale or refinancing of a lease is 
permitted, as for example is the practice in France.
20 
                                          
19 US GAO (2008, p. 42); Bel and Foote (2009). 
20 Bel and Foote (2009); Joint Transport Research Centre (2008, Annex 1.2).   24
 
4.4  Other Public objectives 
  The franchise agreement is a natural place to make specific any other public objectives 
that might differ from private ones. Examples include environmental practices, links to the larger 
road network, price stability, and worker protection. Some public objectives, such as safety 
measures and scenic values, affect private profitability and so will be considered automatically to 
some extent, but insufficiently if they involve spillover effects beyond what is reflected in users’ 
willingness to pay. 
  Requiring the franchisee to meet objectives other than those that increase profits will 
naturally tend to reduce the value of the franchise to the private operator and hence the sizes of 
private bids for that franchise. This tradeoff is vividly illustrated by Bel and Foote (2009), who 
estimate the value of various provisions among the franchise terms on five recent road 
privatizations: two in the US (Chicago Skyway and Indiana Toll Road) and three in France (three 
parts of its motorway network). The two US franchises were won with bids of 60 and 63 times 
current earnings, whereas the three French cases had multiples between 12 and 13.
21  
  Several factors accounted for this striking difference in contract value. Three of the most 
important were term length, allowed toll increases, and maximum leverage ratio — factors also 
highlighted by Forsgren and Macdonald (2005) as affecting franchise value. 
  The US auctions, which specified very long term lengths, also exhibited much larger 
spreads between the first- and second-highest bids. This variation may be explained by different 
bidders assuming different growth rates for operating expenses and traffic. Traffic growth would 
probably be even more important if these were “greenfield” projects (i.e. new roads) rather than 
                                          
21 Earnings are here measured net of operating expenses but not of capital charges — specifically, they are “earnings 
before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization” (EBITDA).   25
“brownfield” (enhancements to existing roads). The dispersion of expectations is a useful 
reminder of the very real possibility that the winning private firm could be basing its bid on 
overly optimistic assumptions and, as a result, could encounter subsequent financial problems. 
  The quantitative effects on bid price of the three factors just mentioned are detailed in 
Table 1, which summarizes simulations by Bel and Foote (2009). The authors compute the 
present discounted value of future cash flows,
22 and assume that 97.3 percent of this value 
remains after transaction fees. Their base case simulation uses assumptions aimed at explaining 
the actual winning bid for the Chicago Skyway franchise, whereas other simulations change key 
parameters in ways approximating their values in the French toll road auctions. As seen in the 
table, changing any one of the three key parameters has the effect of cutting the bid nearly in 
half; changing all three simultaneously cuts it by 76 percent (from $1.83 to $0.43 billion) and 
lowers the hypothetical ratio of bid price to earnings to 15. Accounting in addition for the higher 
cost of capital implied by the French limitation on debt leverage (debt no more than 7 times 
earnings) cuts the ratio to 12.5, a nearly exact match to what was observed in the three French 
concessions. Thus, it is plausible that these four differences between the US and French 
situations explain most or all of the differences in the resulting ratios of bid price to earnings. 
 
                                          
22 Nominal revenues in each year are discounted to the starting year using a nominal annual cost of capital of 
9.38%, which is a weighted average of 12.3% for equity and 8.00% for debt.   26
 
($ billions) multiple of 
earnings
Actual bids
Winning bid 1.83 63.1
Second highest bid 0.70 24.1
French toll roads (average) -- 12.3
Simulated bids
Base case (winning bid) 1.83 63.1
Individual parameter adjustments:
(1) Term length (99 → 23 years) 1.03 35.6
(2) Toll growth rate (3.78% → 2.08%) 1.06 36.5




(1)+(2)+(3) + higher cost of capital            
(9.38% → 11.71%) 0.36 12.5
Value




  Since three of these four parameters may be regarded as attempts to protect the public 
interest (through a shorter term length, lower tolls, and more secure financing), most of the 
difference between the French and US winning bids can be regarded as the cost to French 
taxpayers of these protections. Are these public benefits worth the costs? This is a difficult 
question whose answer involves value judgments. But at least the question can be formulated 
quantitatively, given the information revealed by the bidding process, and thus is open to public 
discussion. 
 
4.5  Term length of franchise 
  As shown in Section 4.4, the value of a franchise can be substantially enhanced if the 
franchise covers a long time period, e.g. 50 years or more. This is because the traffic growth 
expected over the life of the road results in much greater profits in later than earlier years.   27
Indeed, almost every new toll road involves plans for a “ramp-up” period of many years in which 
tolls fail to cover operating expenses, interest, and depreciation. Thus, the ability to attract 
private finance is greatly enhanced by long term lengths. 
  But as discussed earlier, a long term makes it more difficult to specify toll rates. By the 
same argument, other conditions that may be part of a franchise — safety measures, capacity 
enhancements, maintenance standards, and conditions for adding competing capacity — are 
more difficult to specify far in advance. How can anyone know what conditions will prevail, or 
what standards will be deemed appropriate, 75 or 99 years from now? 
  Another factor is the role of political decisions. A long-term franchise, if enforceable, has 
the advantage of minimizing political tinkering later on. But what is to prevent a future 
government from reneging on the terms of the franchise? The court system offers some 
protection, but changing public interest might produce a consensus that the original terms have 
become outmoded. Furthermore, the public sector retains other powers, such as regulation and 
taxation, that can affect the profitability of the franchise. Thus, there is some political risk for the 
private operator that probably increases with term length. 
  An auction mechanism proposed by Engel, Fischer, and Galetovic (2001) avoids some of 
these problems by letting the term length of the lease depend on experience in a specified way. 
The specific proposal is to base bids on the “least present value of revenues” required. Consider 
for simplicity the case when a road is expected to be profitable. Instead of submitting bids based 
on toll rates or on annual profits to be shared, firms would bid on the present value of future 
revenues they would receive, with present value calculated using one or more interest rates 
specified as part of the bidding process. The firm proposing the lowest such present value wins 
the bid and is then allowed to collect revenues until that present value is achieved, after which   28
the road reverts to the public sector. This type of auction reduces the impact of uncertain factors 
in the distant future by letting the time period over which they operate be variable. Specifically, 
it maintains most of the desirable incentives of other franchise arrangements — to build cost-
effectively, to provide good service, to keep collection costs down — but it allows the public 
sector to retain much of the risk due to uncertain traffic levels and future allowed toll rates. If a 
future government wants to adjust the toll formula or build competing capacity, it can do so 
without upsetting the franchise so long as the franchisee will still be able to earn enough to 
eventually reach the specified present value. The same principle can be applied to an 
unprofitable road if the auction process specifies a specific form for public subsidies. 
  To summarize, there are advantages to both short- and long-term franchises, the latter 
probably involving more profit for the franchisee but also more risks for both parties. A variable-
term contract, such as that offered in an auction based on least prevent value of revenues, is an 
attractive alternative. 
 
4.6  Renegotiations and bail-outs 
  Franchise agreements sometimes lead to renegotiations when conditions differ from those 
anticipated by one or both parties. Reasons could include impending bankruptcy, unanticipated 
congestion, changes in political governance, or adverse publicity over some aspect of the public-
private relationship. In Spain, renegotiations are said to be an expected normal part of the 
franchise process, allowing provisions to be “rebalanced” to reflect new information (US GAO 
2008, p. 47). The UK government changed its mind about private operation of the Skye Bridge 
in Scotland, and ultimately purchased the bridge from the private operator. In the US, impending 
bankruptcy forced reconsideration of the terms of the Dulles Greenway concession in Virginia,   29
and public outcry over a non-compete provision caused the franchise for the “91 Express Lanes” 
in California to be bought out by the local public transportation authority. Such renegotiations 
can add substantially to the transactions costs of PPPs, which are already quite high — perhaps 3 
percent of project costs as opposed to about 1 percent for public procurement (Välilä 2005, p. 
109). 
  Engel, Fischer, and Galetovic (2003) argue that prevalent renegotiations of highway 
franchises in Latin America prevented the realization of hoped-for benefits of highway 
privatization there. Unlike the original franchise arrangements, renegotiations tended to take 
place outside of public view. Furthermore:  
Such renegotiations negate the public benefits of private highways by giving an 
advantage to firms with political connections, limiting the risk of losses, and reducing the 
incentives to be effective and cautious in assessing project profitability. (p. 131) 
 
They attribute these renegotiations mainly to two factors. First, governments enacted and 
implemented privatization policies in haste, failing to have sound regulatory mechanisms in 
place beforehand. Second, the use of fixed-term contracts caused all the demand risk to be borne 
by the private party, which as we have seen makes it subject to factors outside of its control. 
Another factor, which may be endemic, was that highway plans tended to be made during 
economic booms, causing a systematic tendency to overestimate future revenues through 
extrapolation from recent trends. Guasch (2004) provides further details. 
  The prospect of renegotiations lends weight to the importance of designing good 
contracts to begin with, and suggests that such contracts may want to specify a framework for 
subsequent renegotiations that leaves neither party at the mercy of the other. 
   30
5. Conclusion 
  We have seen that private provision of highway services offers potential benefits in many 
situations, but to realize them requires considerable public involvement and sophistication. 
  One such benefit is a wider range of funding sources available for investments in 
highway infrastructure, due to fiscal and political constraints on governments and the availability 
of private funds seeking time profiles and risk structures compatible with toll roads. 
Furthermore, private firms can usually react more quickly to opportunities than can the public 
sector, and thus can help when there is a backlog of needed infrastructure investments. 
  Another benefit is risk-sharing; but private provision is not simply a way for the public 
sector to shed risk. Rather, through the franchising process it is possible to specify terms that 
allow each entity to bear the risk it is most suited for and to give each party incentives to 
minimize the adverse consequences of uncertain events, either by preventing them or by adapting 
to them. As for the remaining uncertainty, there is no strong reason to believe that either the 
private or the public sector has a general advantage in bearing it, although one may have an 
advantage in specific situations. 
  A third benefit is that private firms may well realize some cost efficiencies relative to the 
public sector. But such efficiencies remain unproven and are probably less in highways than in 
some other sectors. Private partnerships do perform more closely to the original budgets and time 
schedules, but this does not necessarily imply cost savings because those plans are themselves 
affected by whether the provider is public or private. 
  Because road services cannot plausibly constitute a competitive market, any use of 
private operators needs to be accompanied by some restraint on market power. Such restraint can 
be achieved by toll regulation, but doing so tends to eliminate desirable price flexibility and also   31
requires unrealistic amounts of information about future conditions. A more promising approach 
is an auction that specifies a particular financial target, the amount of which is the subject of the 
firms’ bids, allowing toll rates and the duration of the franchise to adjust to achieve the target 
that is agreed on. Other public concerns such as safety, environmental goals, service quality, and 
financial stability of the private provider can also be addressed in a franchise agreement. 
  Private provision of express lanes, in direct competition with a publicly owned free road, 
is a special case. The social benefit depends critically on balancing the traffic between the two 
roadways, so as to allow the express lanes to offer a premium service (especially beneficial with 
heterogeneous users) but not to produce too much congestion on the free road. In most cases, the 
public interest is best served if express lanes are priced below a level that would cover their 
construction cost.  
  More generally, private highway provision can produce useful experimentation with 
pricing structures because a private operator has an incentive to adopt time-of-day variation in 
toll rates. Such experiments can provide valuable lessons provided the operator is given some 
pricing flexibility. This may well prove to be the most important benefit, because studies have 
shown that the crude pricing now typical of roads is substantially limiting their efficiency in 
meeting mobility objectives.   32
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